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LETTERS TO
THE EDITOR

,

Tax Reform in the (Multi)National Interest
To the Editor:

H

ow comforting here in the "frozen
to feel
the warmth of Federal Policy Group clients and
their spokesman's views on good tax policy in the na
tional interest. (Perhaps the thaw comes from the warm
Cayman Islands sun?) And I am truly grateful for the
tutorial on the phenomenon of U.S.-owned, but
foreign-flagged ships becoming foreign-owned, foreign
flagged ships. I mast remember to add to my research
for this year the number of high-wage shipping jobs
that accompanied this phenomenon, the extent to
which it adversely affected the United States' naval
warfare preparedness, and the extent to which the ships
were adhering to high labor and environmental stand
ards before the switch but not after.
Or perhaps my time would be better spent advocat
ing policies that truly are in the national interest and
are in the interest of U.S. multinational corporations as
well. These policies are not hard to articulate, although
they are interrelated and it would rnischaracterize them
to cherry pick them out of the context that is explained
furth� below: (1) simplify the corporate �come tax �y
pennitting corporations to expense all capital expendi
tures; (2) move towards territoriality in our interna
tional tax system, recognize the decreasing significance
o! place of organization for corporations,. ':nd recog
�e the legitimacy of certain tax compe_auon by mov
ing towards exclusive source-based taxation; (3) enact a
VAT; (4) cut the corporate tax rate; and (5) in the short
term, enforce the current rules more meaningfully by
enacting modified versions of the Obama and other
recent international tax proposals.
The current controversy surrounding Pres�dent
Obama's international tax proposals seems like an opnorth" 1

1
See Ken Kies, "MythbUSters II: A Fwther Response to Avi
Yonah," Tax Notes Int'[, July 6, 2009, p. 55, Doc 2009-13744, or
2009 WTD 126-10-, see also Jeffrey M. Trinklein, "Mythbusters: A
Response to Avi-Yonah," Tax Notes Int'/, June 15, 2009, p. 949,
Doc2009-J2635, or 2009 WTD 109-10.
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portune moment to try to consider them in context.
How do these proposals fit in with an agenda for U.S.
corporate and international tax reform?
Few observers doubt that such reforms are sorely
needed, for several reasons. First, the long-term budget
ary outlook is unsustainable. Second, the U.S. corpo
rate tax rate is among the highest in the OECD. Third,
the current system raises relatively little revenue and
large amounts of corporate income go untaxed. Fi•
nally, the system is horrendously convoluted and im
poses high transaction costs.
This letter will attempt to raise some proposals for
U.S. corporate and international tax reform. It will be
gin by asking why we need to tax corporations at all,
since the rationale for the corporate tax is important
for assessing reform proposals. It will then discuss op
tions for corporate and international tax reform, begin
ning with long-term options (a 10-year horizon), con
tinuing with the medium term (2-5 years), and
concluding with short-term options like the Obama
proposals (1-2 years). 2

Why Tax Corporations?
Toe problem with jus�g the corporate t�x is that
the incidence of the tax is murky. For econorrusts, the
one thing that is dear is that corporations, as legal enti
ties do not bear the burden of the corporate tax. Taxes
m�t be borne by people, not legal fictions, but af!er SO
years of research into this issue economists are still unde
cided about who bears the burden: the corporation's
shareholders, all capital providers, labor, or consumers.
I do not have a view on this economic issue, nor am
I sure it will ever be definitively resolved (�t seems
likely that the incidence will constantly shift dependmg

2
I would like to thank Phil West and Mike Durst ��r their
very helpful comments, while retaining full responsibility for the
contents.
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on market conditions, which detennine the ease of imposing the burden on someone other than the sh~reholders). However, I have argued elsewhere that tn a
meaningful way the corporate tax can be seen as a tax
on the corporation itself, that is, o~ the peopl~ who
manage the affairs of the legal entity at any given moment. The original rationale for the corporate tax was
to regulate and limit the power of corporate managers
that results from controlling large concentrations of
capital, and I believe this rationale is still the best justification for taxing corporations. 3
If the corporate tax is seen as falling on the corporation itself, several conclusions follow. First, the payment
of the corporate tax can be seen as an aspect of corporate social r-esponsibility. To the extent that the state and not corporations -bears the burden of addressing
problems created in part by corporate actions, Iik~ en_vironmental issues or unemployment, the corporation 1s
responsible for paying taxes to give the state the resources it needs to meet this burden. 4 In that sense corporate management have the same responsibility to pay
their fair share of taxes that individual citizens do.
Second, if the corporate tax is seen as a payment
for the costs imposed by corporate activity on society,
then it is not based on the ability to pay theory that
underlies the modern individual income tax. Instead,
the corporate tax is based on the older exchange
theory: It is a payment for the benefits received by the
corporation in the form of defense, infrastructure, education, and other forms of government activity.
Third, it follows from the second point that from an
international perspective, when there is more than one
taxing jurisdiction, the corporate tax should be primarily source-based. This is congruent with the international tax regime that assigns the primary right to
tax active business income to the source jurisdiction. It
also reflects the fact that corporate residence is not
very meaningful and that corporations do not vote.
Moreover, given the uncertainty about the incidence of
the corporate tax, it should not be seen as a vehicle for
progressive taxation or redistn"bution. Residence-based
corporate taxation is only justified as a backstop to
source-based taxation.

Long-Term Proposals
In the long term (10 years and more), tax refonn in
the United States is dominated by the dire budgetary
prospects. Because of the impending retirement and
healthcare costs of the baby boom generation, we face
the prospect of deficits exceeding $1 trillion per year
for an indefinite period. By 2019, under current projections, the debt to GDP ratio exceeds 80 percent. This

3Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "Corporations, Society and the State:
A Defense of the Corporate Tax," 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193 (2004).
4 Avi-Yonah, "Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic
Tax Behavior," in Taxation and Corporate Governance, ed. Wolfgang
Schoen (2007).
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picture is unsustainable_b~cause neither U.S. nor foreign savers would be wilhng to lend the U.S. government the necessary funds. 5
Since drastic cuts to Social Security and Medicare
are both unjustified and politically unacceptable, this
means that taxes will have to be raised at some point
in the next decade to pay for at least part of the deficit
(the rest can perhaps be covered by restraining the
growth in healthcare costs). Raising the existing individual and corporate income tax rates, or the existing
payroll tax, seems both politically very unlikely and
unwise, given that our main competitors have been
steadily reducing those tax rates.
Thus, in my opinion the only feasible solution in the
long term is to follow the rest of the OECD and enact
a VAT. A VAT enacted in addition to the existing individual and corporate income taxes can be a normal
credit-invoice, destination-based tax, like those in use
in over 130 other countries. It is a proven revenue
raiser even at relatively low rates, as shown by the
Japanese and Canadian experience (both of whom
have a rate of less than 10 percent).
However, as many scholars have suggested, it would
also be possible to enact a VAT at a higher rate and
use the revenue to replace part of the individual and
corporate income tax. Michael Graetz, for example,
has suggested using the VAT revenues to exempt income up to $100,000 from individual income tax (for
simplification purposes) and for replacing the corporate
tax (for competitiveness reasons).6
I am doubtful that we can go as far as Graetz recommends. We need the added revenues, and the
Graetz proposals are designed to be revenue neutral.
Nor do I think it is advisable to raise the VAT rate too
high. Experience in Europe has shown that high VJ:--T
rates, like high income tax rates, lead to more evasion
and avoidance and higher transaction costs.
In addition, I think abolishing the corporate tax
would be a mistake (and unlikely to fly politically).
Enacting a VAT in lieu of the corporate tax would
tempt politicians to see the VAT as a form of co-!JX>rate
tax and load it with entity-based exemptions des1~ed
to regulate corporate behavior and encourage d~s~ed
activities. These functions are best left to the ex1sang
corporate tax. The VAT should be as clean as possible,
with a low flat rate and a broad base. 7
However, I do think the corporate tax can be signifi·
cantly simplified if we enact a VAT. Specifically, I
would support permitting corporations to expense all

5 Alan Auerbach and William Gale "The Economic Crisis
and the Fiscal Crisis: 2009 and Beyond," available at http:/ I
WWW.taxpolicycenter.org/publica1ions/url.cfm?ID=411843.
6 M ichael J. Graetz, JOO Million UnnecesS<Jry Rerums: A Simp/e,
Fair, and Competitive Plan for tire United States (2008).
7Avi-Yonah, " Designing a Federal VAT: Summary and Rec·
ommendations," Tax L Rev. (forthcoming), avaHable at http://
ssrn .com/abstract= 1422092.
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capital expenditures. From· an economics perspective
this turns the corporate tax into a cash flow or con
sumption tax. This change leads to significant simpiifi-·
cation because corporations will not have to account . \
for basis and will dispense with taxable and tax-free
realization events, but it should not be a major revenue
loser because the resulting tax only exempts the risk
free rate of return on capital, while economic rents
remain taxable. Most corporate income consists of
economic rents, and those are the kinds of income that
justify the corporate tax because the state makes them
possible (risk-free returns can be earned in many loca
tions but rents are more unique). The revenue loss can
be made up with the VAT. Nor is this change unprec
edented, because the United Kingdom made it when it
introduced the VAT in the 1 970s.

Medium-Term Proposals
In the medium term, it would be desirable to move
the corporate tax more in the direction of a pure
source-based tax, for the reasons explained above.
However, we cannot do that without first tackling the
knotty problems of defining the source of income and
transfer pricing. Moving to territoriality without re
forming transfer pricing is a recipe for increased shift
ing of profits outside the U. S. taxing jurisdiction.
My ·c;lleagues Michael Durst and Kimberly Clausing
and I have develop�d a detailed proposal to reform trans
fer pricing and the source rules by adopting formulary
apportionment.8 Our proposed formula is based on the
current profit split regulations and assigns normal re
turns to where the costs of producing income are in
curred, while residuals are assigned based on the destina
tion of sales. This formula favors the United States as an
importing country, and one can imagine different formu
las negotiated with the EU if it goes ahead and adopts
formulary apportionment for internal EU purposes, as
the European Commission has proposed.
we· believe that we have adequately addressed the
various objections raised to our proposal, and that the
benefits far exceed the costs. One particular objection,
that formulary apportionment violates our treaty obliga
tions, has been weakened by the recent Ninth Circuit
decision in Xilinx (in which the court held that the saving
clause in U. S. treaties exempts all U.S. resident corpora
tions from the arm's-length standard, and this would
apply to subsidiaries of foreign multinationals as well).
biggest advantage of adopting o� pro�sal � that
it will enable the United States to move i..n the direction
of territoriality. Not only will dividends, interest, and
royalties within a U.S.-based multinational be exempt
from tax but in principle we could go further and abolish
bot� subpart F and the foreign tax credit. Conceptually,

Th�

8
Avi-Yonah Kimberly A. Clausing, and Michael C. Durst,
"Allocating Bu�iness Profits for Tax Purposes: A Propos� to · · :
Adopt a Formulary Profit Split," F1a. Tax Rev. (forthcorrung, , .:
•
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstr�ct= 1 3 1 7327. ,
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formulary apportionment means that the United States
will tax each multinational (whether U. S.- or foreign. based) only on the income that the formula assigns to the
United States, and on no other income. We do not be
lieve this will result in more double taxation than the
current arm's-length system even if other countries do
not follow the U.S. ' s lead, but we also think that other
countries will in fact follow our lead because otherwise
multinationals will find it too easy to shift income to the
United States (where booking it will have no tax conse- .'
quences under the formula).
One potential downside to eliminating residence
based corporate taxation in this way would be that tax
competition might be enhanced. We do not have a
problem with tax competition per se; countries should
be free to set their general corporate tax rate as low as
they choose, and we have estimated that adopting for
mulary apportionment would enable the United States
to finance a significant cut in the corporate tax rate.
Tax competition in the form of incentives for multi�
nationals would persist under pure source-based taxation based on formulary apportionment, but we do not •,
regard that form of competition as necessarily harmful,
as long as it is based on a careful analysis of the costs
and benefits of the tax incentive. However, formulary
apportionment would take care of the worst form of
tax competition, in which profits are shifted arbitrarily
without any real consequences. The data show that this
form of tax competition is rampant (8 of the top 1 0 · ,
locations for U.S. multinational profits had effective tax
rate of 10 percent or less in 2005, and none of them
had corresponding real investment).

Short-Term Proposals
In the short term, I believe the Obama proposals are
on the right track, because as long as transfer pricing
reform is not enacted bolstering residence-based corpo
rate taxation is necessary as a backstop to source-based
taxation. The Obama proposals are a cautious first step
in this direction and are justified by the data showing
massive under-taxation of the foreign profits of U. S.
based multinationals. 9

However, I also believe that some additional proposals
might be helpful. Specifically, I would argue that some of
the added revenue should be used to finance a cut in the
corporate tax rate to bring it more into line with those of .
our trading partners. Although the effective U.S. tax rate ·
is not particularly high, studies show that the marginal
rate affects investment patterns, so that having the
econd highest rate in the OECD is not advisable.
If the Obama proposals for multinational taxation
e adopted, the following further ideas should be
plemented in the short run:

9Avi-Yonah, "Obama's International Tax Plan a Major Step
•'orward," Tax Notes Int'/, May 1 1 , 2009, p. 448, Doc 2009-10/21,
r 2009 WTD 85-12.

AUGUST 3, 20 09 • 383

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
1. To protect U.S. residence-based taxation from
inversion transactions, the "managed and controlled" definition of U.S. corporate residence
from the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act should be
adopted as well.
The Obama proposals increase the pressure on
the distinction between U.S.- and foreign-based
multinationals, and I believe the current antiinversion rule in section 7874 is insufficient.
When the United Kingdom beefed up its controlled foreign corporation rules in conjunction
with adopting limited territoriality, some U.K.
corporations nominally moved to Ireland, but
Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs are challenging this purported move because they have the
managed and controlled standard to rely on. The
IRS should have the same ability.
2. The foreign tax credit ideas should be implemented in conjunction with full cross-crediting
(i.e., no distinction between the active and passive
baskets).
The need for baskets depends on how many U.S.
multinationals are in an excess credit position,
because if they are in excess limit there is no incentive to invest overseas. Since our tax rate is
now higher than our trading partners' this is an
unlikely outcome and the added complexity of
having even two baskets is unjustified.
3. If we adopt the refundable withholding tax on
nonqualified intermediary portfolio investment,
then we can abolish all "regular" outbound withholding on dividends, interest, and royalties, as
well as the branch profit tax.
The need to impose withholding taxes arises from
the need to protect the domestic U.S. tax base,
but this is adequately dealt with in the Obama
proposals by a combination of information exchange and refundable withholding. If those are
enacted I see no need for regular withholding.
Vfe do not withhold on portfolio interest, royalties, and capital gains, and dividend withholding
is easily avoided by using derivatives. The only
meaningful withholding is on direct dividends,
and even that is eliminated by some of our recent
treaties. I do not believe we need withholding for
treaty neg_otiation p_urposes since we already have
treaties with low withholding rates with all
OECD members, and non-OECD countries are
uninterested in reducing U.S. withholding on
portfolio investments. Thus, we can save a lot of
transaction costs at little revenue by eliminating
regular withholding and the branch profit tax.
4. On the other hand, we should tighten up the
earning stripping rules by applying the section
7874 standards to all foreign corporations, and
extend them to royalties as well.
These provisions are needed as added protection
for the U.S. corporate tax base. In the absence of
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transfer pricing reform foreign multinationals
(and inverted U.S. multinationals not caught by
section 7874, like grandfathered ones) have too
much ability to strip income out of the United
States via interest and royalty payments, as the
current Glaxo litigation shows.
5. Finally, I would abolish the Foreign Investment
Real Property Tax Act and replace it with a tax
on capital gains on large participations (to the
extent consistent with our treaty obligations).
It never made sense to tax foreigners on U.S. real
estate, which cannot be exported, and the tax can
be avoided by using foreign holding corporations.
FIRPTA also imposes transaction costs whenever
there is uncertainty about whether over 50 percent of corporate value is in real estate, even for
small portfolio shareholders. On the other hand,
when a foreign multinational acquires a U.S.based one, it can export valuable intangibles at
will, and that should be reflected by taxing it on
dispositions, as many countries do. The tax can
be enforced because any buyer of large participations wants to register shares in its name and obtain voting rights. We should not override treaties,
but should renegotiate our existing ones if they
do not allow such a tax (and many do).
Some form of tax reform seems inevitable, at least
in the long run. In the short run, if there is going to be
any nontax legislation that costs additional money, it
seems quite likely that tax provisions would be attached to it, and that taxing multinationals and U.S.
residents who evade their tax obligations is more politically acceptable than taxing the middle class.
For these reasons, I think that despite the current
torrent of criticism, some form of the Obama proposals will be enacted in 2009. The preceding has been
an attempt to offer some additional suggestions for
short-, medium-, and long-term reform of U.S. corporate and international taxation. If we want to keep taxing corporations (and I believe we should, for the reasons set out in the beginning), some form of reform
along these lines would seem necessary to prevent the
corporate tax base from being completely eroded by
shifting profits overseas, while keeping the U.S.
economy competitive with our trading partners.
Oh, and one more thing: Michigan can be quite a
nice summer vacation destination. 10
♦
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law
Director, International Tax
LL.M.,
University of Michigan
July 20, 2009

10 See

http://www.michigan.org/.
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